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The work of Shaw and Mckay (1942) paved the way for researchers to study inner-city crime by 
focusing on the environment and its effects on residents. Social disorganization, characterized by 
weakened institutions led researchers to analyze and predict patterns of crime in urban areas. 
Researchers argue that social disorganization theory arguments developed from this approach, 
but lost appeal among researchers due to limited empirical tests. The theory experienced a 
renewed interest in the 1980s, as structural factors (eg. poverty, heterogeneity, residential 
mobility, racial inequality, and family disruption) were considered, all of which allowed 
researchers to study patterns of crime in large urban areas. The latest argument put forward in the 
1990s is that wider macro-structural forces, may actually promote structural antecedents that lead 
to community social disorganization, which Bursik (1989) and Sampson & Wilson (1995) 
discuss as conscious political decisions. This study seeks to examine drug law enforcement as a 
macro structural force which implicates past and current social policy. In other words, drug-
related policy measures are examined as explanatory variables linked to elements of social 
disorganization. The study uses US cities from the 2000 Census with populations of 250,000 or 
more as the unit of analysis. Results from OLS regression techniques will be used to discuss the 
study’s implication for social disorganization theory and US public policy. Additionally, the 
study implicates arguments by Quinney (2001) about potential social problems related to police 
discretion. 
 Keywords: drug law enforcement, social disorganization theory, OLS regression, crime 
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Amidst the current opioid and heroin epidemic, communities across the country are 
calling for a softer approach to drug use and addiction. A recent New York Times article, 
discusses this trend, regarding suburban New Hampshire areas. The article starts out with the 
story of a typical middle class family, where a student, Courtney, who played French horn in 
high school, and had a bright future, died of a heroin overdose at age 20. Courtney’s father noted 
that when he was younger and had an office in New York City he saw junkies everywhere, and 
according to him, “they were the worst.” But, his personal tragedy along many others in 
suburban towns across the northeast are changing the negative perceptions people used to have 
about drug addicts years ago. The growing number of families whom have lost loved ones to 
drug addiction are now using their influence, anger, and resources to curve the governmental 
response to drugs into a gentler approach, which emphasizes treatment not incarceration (Seelye, 
2015). 
Michael Botticelli, director of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, 
and a former addict himself explains the shift in the conversation regarding drug use and 
addiction. He argues that the demographics of people affected are different (white). They are 
more apt to “call a legislator”, “get angry” and advocate through the right venues. Contrary to the 
previous years during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, the tough on crime and punishment rhetoric is 
out, while compassion and treatment is the new focus. This has become evident in the recent 
debates both for Democrats and Republicans, who share stories of how addiction has touched 
their families and are now calling for a softer, treatment oriented approach to drugs. While this 
approach is certainly welcomed, one cannot ignore the stark differences between previous drug 
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scares and the governmental response to them. As Kimberle Williams Crenshaw notes, “one 
cannot help but notice that had this compassion existed for African-Americans caught up in 
addiction and the behaviors it produces, the devastating impact of mass incarceration upon entire 
communities would never have happened.” (Seelye, 2015, p.3) 
Indeed, the response to drug problems and violence in the last four decades has been 
everything but compassionate or soft, especially for communities of color. For example, in four 
short decades the racial and ethnic composition of US prisoners has reversed, from 70% white at 
the mid-century point to approximately 70% black and Latino in recent years (LaFree et al., 
1992; Sampson & Lauritzen, 1997). Todd Clear (2007) argues that most of the growth in prison 
population had little to do with crime; rather, it has been the product of a series of broad policy 
choices. Policy choices like the abolition of parole statutes in the 1970s, mandatory minimum 
sentences for drug offenses and disparate sentencing guidelines for crack vs cocaine have been 
essential in maintaining and increasing a prison population in times where crime rates have 
decreased (Clear, 2007; Mauer, 1999; Tonry, 1995; Sirin, 2011). Furthermore, these policies 
have been grounded on the assumptions of deterrence and rational choice theory, in which the 
offender calculates the perceived risks associated with crime before engaging in it. Following 
this logic, drug policy has employed draconian sentences for drug offenders in hopes of deterring 
them from drug use and trafficking. 
In the wake of a perceived crack-cocaine epidemic in the 1980s, the death of University 
of Maryland basketball star Len Bias triggered a response from legislators who saw the overdose 
as the tipping point of a crack epidemic. The response to the crack epidemic frenzy came in the 
form of the Anti-Abuse Act of 1986, and the Omnibus Drug Abuse Act of 1988, both acts 
triggered massive new allocation of funds to fight the war on drugs. The acts enhanced 
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mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses, established a 100:1 ratio for crack cocaine 
offenses in which 5 grams of crack triggered the same mandatory minimum sentence as 500 
grams of cocaine (Sirin, 2011). Both acts increased funding for law enforcement agencies, which 
deployed aggressive tactics aimed at seeking and arresting drug offenders at any cost. The 
rhetoric at the time also fueled calls for more aggressive tactics in dealing with drugs and 
violence concentrated in minority urban enclaves. 
According to Banks (2009), public policies can be identified by one of three different 
motivators, ideologically based, empirically based, or ethically based. Policies based on ideology 
are desirable because they fit into the assumptions and preconceived notions of those who seek 
to pass them. Empirically based policies are based on the scientific knowledge that is available at 
the time, these policies emphasize knowledge. Ethically based policies are centered on a moral 
compass of good and right or bad and wrong. These policies come as a reaction of moral panics, 
in which media portrayal of the events are often exaggerated, biased, and inaccurate in nature 
(Banks, 2009; Cohen, 1973). According to Banks (2009), politicians react to these panics in a 
visceral and instinctive manner rather than in a rational and informed manner, which can in turn 
exacerbate the problems a given policy seeks to alleviate. This study argues that a 
comprehensive analysis of the relationship between race and crime in urban areas would be 
incomplete without considering public policy and its effect on cities. Thus, the focus of this 
study will be placed on the consequences of a visceral and instinctive reaction to drug problems 
in major cities. 
Ecological theories of crime seeking to explain spatial variations in urban crime rates by 
the ability of communities to control its residents have largely ignored the impact of state control 
strategies on processes of neighborhood organization and crime (Clear, 2008). Rose and Clear, 
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(1998) argue that state social controls, typically directed at individual behaviors have important 
effects on family and neighborhood structures, which in turn may exacerbate the problems that 
lead to crime in the first place. This is especially true in the case of drug law enforcement, which 
is concentrated in neighborhoods with very dim ecological contexts to begin with. Sampson and 
Wilson (1995) seek to build on traditional social disorganization theory and explore the 
relationship between race and crime by taking into account the larger political and macro-
structural forces (racial segregation, structural economic transformation, housing discrimination, 
etc.) responsible for the differential distribution of blacks into communities characterized by a 
concentration of poverty, family disruption, and residential instability (Sampson & Wilson, 
1995; Cullen & Agnew, 2011).  
By emphasizing complex interactions of individual level predictors of crime and 
community characteristics, the social disorganization framework is suited to address problems 
associated both to drugs and drug law enforcement practices that are concentrated in poor inner 
city neighborhoods. The literature appears silent on the relationship between drug law 
enforcement activities and its effect on structural determinants of social disorganization theory 
and crime. This study seeks to fill the gap in the literature and empirically test the arguments put 
forward by Sampson and Wilson (1995). Influenced by analyses in a preliminary study 
(Grantham, 2005) and arguments by Robert Grantham (2012) in Urban Society: The Shame of 
Governance, this study conceptualizes drug law enforcement activities as conscious political 
decisions related to the disproportionate confinement of minorities into communities 
characterized by structural social disorganization and cultural isolation. The questions guiding 
this study are as follow, (1) What is the relationship between drug law enforcement activities and 
structural antecedents of social disorganization theory (poverty, family disruption, residential 
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instability, and residential segregation) in cities with 250,000 residents or more? (2) What is the 
relationship between drug law enforcement activities and violent crime rates in cities with 
250,000 residents or more? The hypotheses are as follow: (1) As drug law enforcement activities 
increase, structural antecedents of social disorganization will increase, and (2) As consistent with 
the literature, as structural determinants of social disorganization increases, violent crime rates 


















The following section will provide the reader with a background on social 
disorganization theory, its development and evolution. While providing a comprehensive 
background on the theory, this study focuses on arguments put forward by Sampson and Wilson 
(1995). The war on drugs and its development will also be discussed, along with the purpose of 
the war, when it was launched and the consequences it has had on minority communities. This 
war is one of the few federal policies passed since the 1970s to address the social ills that 
concentrate in large cities. However, this urban policy seems to be more focused on 
criminalizing and containing the dangerous populations in urban centers than on revitalizing 
urban centers. Unfortunately, United States politics have been characterized by the exploitation 
of moral panics about crime (Chambliss, 1994), which in turn has helped establish an 
increasingly repressive law and order regime (Becket, 1997). This regime raises questions of 
legitimacy regarding the criminal justice system for black communities, which are 
disproportionately affected by a series of policies that use incarceration for the purposes of social 
control (Bobo & Thompson, 2006). 
Social Disorganization Theory  
Over half a century ago, researchers Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay (1942) argued that 
the structure of communities mattered more in explaining delinquency and crime, than the 
individual characteristics of offenders. The theory focused on the relationship between 
community characteristics and delinquency, mainly the extent in which differences in economic 
and social characteristics of local areas helped to predict variations in crime and delinquency 
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(Shaw & McKay, 1942). Shaw and McKay were the first ones to empirically test this 
relationship. They plotted the residential location of delinquent youths on a map, and found that 
the residential location of delinquent youths were located in areas of the city that were marked by 
a prevalence of  neighborhood characteristics such as residential mobility, poverty, transiency 
and ethnic/racial heterogeneity; and closest to the central business district in the city. In these 
areas, delinquency rates were steadily high, pointing to the neighborhood as a catalyst for 
delinquency, not the individual traits of residents.  
These findings paved the way for the creation of social disorganization theory and the 
ecological study of crime for years to come. Their study showed that delinquency, crime and 
deviance were prevalent in areas that experienced other social problems like poverty, 
unemployment, broken families and residential mobility. Contrary to individualistic theories, 
crime and delinquency in these areas were thought of as “the normal reaction of normal people to 
abnormal social conditions” (Plant, 1937, p.248). Shaw and McKay broadly suggested that social 
disorganization referred to the breakdown of the social institutions in a community. For example, 
in the inner city, families would be disrupted, schools would be substandard, adult run activities 
would be lacking, and people would not participate in political groups or communal 
organizations like church. The breakdown of these social institutions meant that adults would be 
unable to control youths and prevent them from joining gangs or engaging in delinquent acts. 
Lacking control and supervision from adults in the community, youths would come in contact 
with older juveniles who would transmit criminal values and skills (Kubrin et al 2009; Sampson 
& Groves, 1989). Although Shaw and McKay gained an understanding of the process by which 
youths became embedded in delinquency through in depth interviews (see Shaw & McKay, 
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1969), a shortage of empirical tests on this portion of the theory led researchers to abandon the 
theory (Cullen & Agnew, 2011). 
Despite the emergence of more individualistic theories of crime in the 1960s and 1970s, 
Shaw and McKay’s social disorganization theory experienced a renewed interest in the 1980s. 
Researchers acknowledged the value of the theory because of a general interest in the ecology of 
crime, or variation in crime rates by ecological units such as neighborhoods, cities, or states 
(Kubrin et al, 2009). In 1982, Judith and Peter Blau got the attention of social disorganization 
scholars. They examined 125 of the largest metropolitan areas in the United States, and found 
that violence was more prevalent in areas marked by socioeconomic inequality, especially by a 
wide economic gap between African Americans and Whites. They concluded that “high rates of 
criminal violence are apparently the price of racial and economic inequalities” (p.126).  The 
study showed the importance of community characteristics in understanding the root causes of 
crime in urban America. Moreover, the study showed that conservative governmental policies 
embraced during the 1980s, might fuel criminogenic social conditions, thus making streets less 
safe.   
Social disorganization theory gained popularity as researchers were able to better 
conceptualize and test the mediating processes by which structural antecedents (poverty, family 
disruption, mobility, and heterogeneity) affected crime. Social disorganization refers to the 
inability of local communities to realize the common values of their residents or solve commonly 
experienced problems (Kornhauser, 1978, p.63). The theory posits that when structures of 
community social organization are prevalent and strong, crime and delinquency should be less 
prevalent. When the same structures are weak or non-existing, crime and delinquency are 
prevalent (Cullen & Agnew, 2011). For example, Sampson (1986) argued that crime was high in 
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inner cities because the residents were not able to exercise informal social controls, especially in 
areas where most families were broken. Kornhauser (1978) defined informal social controls as 
the scope of collective intervention that the community directs toward local problems. Moreover, 
weak structures of formal and informal social control tend to decrease the costs associated with 
alternate norms and rules, making high crime rates and delinquency more likely (Bursik, 1988).  
The social disorganization model is based on the systemic model in which local 
communities are viewed as a “complex system of friendship and kinship networks and formal 
and informal associational ties rooted in family life and ongoing socialization processes” 
(Kasarda and Janowitz, 1974, p.329). Thus, local ties and informal social controls take center 
stage because they mediate the relationship between structural antecedents and crime in urban 
areas. If residents in a neighborhood are not engaging in their community, then they are not able 
to develop friendship and kinship networks that will later help regulate the behavior in their 
community. As argued by Skogan (1986), when residents form local ties, they strengthen their 
capacity for social control because they are better able to recognize residents from strangers and 
engage in guardianship actions against victimization and or crime (p.216). Moreover, a strong 
community in which neighbors work together to address potential problems and or care for each 
other is more likely to regulate behavior effectively. In the systemic model, social organization 
and disorganization are viewed as opposite ends with respect to networks of community control 
(Kubrin et al. 2009). Hence, disorganized communities will experience more crime and 
delinquency while organized communities will not. 
In 1989, scholars Robert J. Sampson and W. Byron Groves were able to empirically test 
social disorganization theory in full. Up to this point, researchers were not able to empirically 
test community level social disorganization, nor the availability of informal social controls due to 
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measurement issues. Rather, previous research had only included the structural antecedents as 
predictors of crime and delinquency, leaving out indicators of social disorganization itself 
(Kubrin et al. 2009). Past research on ecological determinants of crime, or structural 
determinants of social disorganization theory have focused on poverty (Bailey, 1984; Lee, 2000; 
Parker, 1989; Sampson, 1985), Unemployment (Grant & Martinez, 1997; Miethe, Hughes, & 
McDowall, 1991), Income inequality (Blau & Blau, 1982; Farley, 1987; Shihadeh & 
Ousey,1996), family disruption (Sampson, 1987; Sampson & Groves, 1989; Shihadeh & 
Steffensmeier, 1994; Beaulieu & Messner, 2010), and population mobility as key predictors of 
urban crime rates ( Crutchfield, Geerken, & Gove, 1982, Sampson & Groves, 1989; Shaw & 
McKay, 1969). These studies were successful in providing empirical validity for structural 
antecedents of the theory as predictors of crime and delinquency. 
Sampson and Groves (1989) analyzed survey data from over 10,000 residents in 238 
localities to test the theory. They constructed measures of social ties (local friendship networks) 
and informal social controls (Unsupervised teenage peer groups and low organizational 
participation). Respondents were asked, “How many of your friends reside in the local 
community? Defined as the area within a fifteen minute walk from your home”. This measure 
encompassed the availability of local social ties. To measure levels of informal social control, 
and local organizational participation respondents were asked 2 questions. First, “How common 
is it for groups of teenagers to hang out in public in the neighborhood and make nuisances of 
themselves?” Second, respondents were asked about their social and leisure activities for each 
day of the week, broken down by type of activity (Sampson and Groves, 1989). This was the first 
time researchers were able to test the availability of informal social controls and local ties, or the 
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mediating variables of social disorganization theory. In the Sampson and Groves study, these 
variables were theorized as key in mediating the effects of structural antecedents on crime rates. 
In their study, Sampson and Groves (1989) found that residents living in socially 
disorganized communities had low levels of local friendship networks, organizational 
participation; and high levels of unsupervised teenage groups. Consequently, these communities 
had high levels of delinquency and crime. The study rendered support for the intervening 
measures of social disorganization, giving the theory much anticipated empirical validity. 
Warner and Roundtree (1997) tested the role of social ties as a mediator between structural 
conditions such as poverty, ethnic heterogeneity, residential stability and crime rates in 
neighborhoods. In their results, they found that social ties have a direct effect on crime. 
However, it did not mediate the relationship between structural conditions and crime. Bellair 
(1997), examined the role of social ties, using victimization survey data from cities in New York, 
Florida and Missouri. Unlike Warner and Roundtree, Bellair found that measures of social 
interaction mediated much of the effects of structural conditions on crime, consistent with the 
theory (Bellair, 1997). More recent studies such as Lowenkamp et al. (2003) further validate 
social ties and informal social controls as mediators of structural conditions and crime. 
In another study, Bursik and Grasmick (1993) make a clear distinction between social 
disorganization concepts, and the ecological processes that alter the ability of communities to 
self-regulate, which in turn result in crime and delinquency. They view social disorganization as 
“the regulatory capacity of a neighborhood that is imbedded in the structure of that community’s 
affiliational, interactional, and communication ties among the residents” (Bursik,1999, p.86). 
They identify three types of social controls that would be helpful in preventing crime. Private, 
which includes intimate friendship and kinship relationships. Parochial, comprised of less 
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intimate and secondary group relationships like people from church. Public, which refers to 
linkages to groups and institutions located outside the neighborhood, like the ability of a 
neighborhood to influence local politics, among others (Kubrin et al. 2009). Again, local and 
organizational ties are key in regulating the effects of structural antecedents of social 
disorganization and crime in a community. 
Sampson et al. (1997) expand on community level social disorganization measures, and 
propose collective efficacy as a new construct which captures trust among neighbors and the 
willingness to intervene for the common good of the neighborhood. They argue, that social ties 
and networks may be necessary for social control, but not sufficient if they do not engage in 
purposive action. In other words, how the ties are activated and resources are deployed to 
enhance social control matter more than the availability of those alone. For example, if a 
neighborhood is faced with people selling drugs in the corners, neighborhood social ties and 
informal social controls may not be effective in dealing with the issue unless they come together 
and act to tackle the issue at hand. However, Sampson et al. (1997) argue that neighborhoods 
with high levels of collective efficacy should have low levels of crime, and that collective 
efficacy should largely reduce the effects of poverty, residential instability, and other community 
characteristics of crime. Sampson and Raudenbush (1999) provide support for this claim in a 
study of Chicago neighborhoods. They found that even though structural antecedents of the 
theory were responsible for social and physical disorder in neighborhoods, measures of 
collective efficacy greatly reduced this social and physical disorder, pointing to the meaningful 
actions of local ties. 
More recently, some new measurements pertaining to social disorganization’s mediating 
concepts have surfaced. Social capital, defined as those intangible resources produced “in 
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relations among persons that facilitate action” for mutual benefit (Coleman, 1988: 100). Social 
capital, like collective efficacy, local ties, and informal social controls, can help residents combat 
the disruptive effects of structural social disorganization. Researchers such as Kubrin and 
Weitzer (2003) argue that it is the resources transmitted through social ties that are key in 
facilitating social control, not the ties themselves (p. 377). Thus, residing in a community 
occupied by the most disadvantaged segments of the population, in terms of economic, social, 
and cultural values, means that opportunities for advancement in the job market and other areas 
through personal or local ties are few if any. More on the importance of local ties and informal 
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Toward a Macro-Structural Approach 
Although studies have been able to provide much empirical validity to social 
disorganization theory as stated by Shaw and McKay, the lack of contemporary applications of 
the theory has caused criticism from researchers (Bursik, 1988; Kubrin and Weitzer, 2003). 
Recent arguments by Sampson and Wilson (1995) have extended social disorganization theory 
and placed it within the realities of contemporary America. They accept the basic thesis of the 
theory that a breakdown of community controls caused by structural conditions is criminogenic, 
but they argue that social disorganization is not a natural part of the process by which cities grow 
(Cullen & Agnew, 2011). Following Blau & Blau’s (1982) argument, Sampson and Wilson 
argue that variations in social disorganization are linked to racial inequality shaped by “macro-
structural factors”. These factors are responsible for disproportionately consigning African 
Americans into neighborhoods marked by a concentration of severe poverty and family 
disruption. 
The basic thesis of their work is that “macro social patterns of residential inequality give 
rise to the social isolation and ecological concentration of the truly disadvantaged, which in turn 
leads to structural barriers and cultural adaptations that undermine social organization and hence 
the control of crime” ( Sampson and Wilson, 1995, p.38). They point to the very different 
ecological contexts that blacks and whites reside in as being responsible for disproportionate 
rates of violent crime. In other words, a question guiding this line of research is to what extent 
are African Americans as a group are exposed to criminogenic structural conditions compared to 
other races? For example, Sampson (1987) argues that in not one city over 100,000 in the United 
States do Blacks live in ecological equality with whites in terms of economic and family 
structure. He continues by stating that the worst urban context in which whites reside are 
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considerably better than the average context of black communities (Sampson, 1987 p. 354). For 
example, in his study, out of the 156 largest cities, only one had a percentage of Black female 
headed households at or below the mean percentage for white households. Furthermore, only 
three cities in the sample had a higher Black per capita income than the white mean (p.361). As 
stated by Plant (1937), crime is “the normal reaction of normal people to abnormal social 
conditions” (p.248). Thus, the different ecological contexts in which large groups of people 
reside is of ultimate importance.  
Sampson and Wilson (1995) point to the social transformation of inner cities in recent 
decades as responsible for concentrating the most disadvantaged segments of the urban black 
population, those who are poor and female-headed families with children. Whereas one out of 
every five poor blacks resided in extreme poverty areas in 1970, nearly two out of every five 
poor blacks resided in extreme poverty by 1980 (W.J. Wilson et al. 1988, p.131). This is 
important because basic institutions of an area like churches, schools and recreational facilities, 
are more likely to remain viable if the core of their support comes from more economically 
stable families living in the same communities. This also has an effect on the social capital of the 
city or neighborhood, as more affluent or stable neighbors leave, the chances of job referrals or 
mentoring for youths disappear. So, the concentration of disadvantaged segments of the 
population into an area means that this area will become isolated from the realm of opportunities 
and values that are afforded to mainstream America.  
The macro structural factors that Sampson and Wilson (1995) discuss can be both historic 
and contemporary. They include racial segregation, structural economic transformation and black 
male joblessness, class linked outmigration from the inner city, housing discrimination, among 
others (Cullen & Agnew, 2011). These factors are responsible for concentrating minorities into 
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communities that are marked by a concentration of disadvantage and family disruption, leading 
to cultural and structural social disorganization. Korhauser (1978) defines cultural 
disorganization as the “attenuation of societal cultural values” (p.85). She argues that structurally 
disorganized cities are conducive to the emergence of cultural value systems that seem to view 
violence, crime and deviance as an expected part of everyday life (Sampson and Wilson, 1995). 
In other words, while residents in these communities may not approve of, or promote violence 
and or crime, such is viewed as an expected daily occurrence which is unavoidable regardless of 
personal values or self-control (see Anderson, 1999). Because people and families in these 
communities have to constantly worry about the economic and social hardships they experience, 
the regulation of behavior in the neighborhood might not be a pressing concern or priority. 
This reality may influence the probability of other harmful and deviant behaviors in the 
community like drug use and using violence to settle possible disputes. Also, because many inner 
city communities are isolated from mainstream opportunities, culture and society, inner city 
residents may be in constant conflict with behaviors and expectations considered normal by 
mainstream society (Anderson, 1999). For example, while society outside these communities 
may emphasize hard work and education as means to succeed in life, these communities may 
rely on other illegal venues as means to acquire the same success in life. Residents in these 
communities are not consciously choosing to engage in illegal activity to get by or get ahead in 
life, rather the lack of legitimate opportunities leaves them with no other option. In short, the 
goal to become financially successful is universal across cities and communities, but the means 
available to do so is not (Merton, 1938). Hence, illegal markets are expected to develop in areas 
that are economically depressed in order to compensate for the lack of legitimate opportunities 
and achieve a shared goal of success. 
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Sociologists, Criminologists, and other social science scholars argue that because social 
capital and opportunities are scarce in these communities, organizations and institutions are 
essential for socializing youths into acceptable behaviors, and provide them with opportunities 
which are compatible with those in other cities. For example, Sampson (2012) points to the 
importance of community level organizations in predicting levels of collective efficacy, 
collective civic actions, and consequently crime. Organizations such as community newspapers, 
family planning clinics, counseling or mentoring services, treatment centers for alcohol and drug 
addiction and other local agencies typically act to ensure the well-being of larger community 
areas. Communities marked by structural social disorganization and broken down institutions 
will expose residents to subcultural values and behaviors that are not consistent with mainstream 
culture (Anderson, 1999). Because of the lack of effective institutions and local organizations, 
residents in these communities will not be exposed to opportunities that may help them better 
their lives and the communities in which they reside. Furthermore, the lack of institutions and 
organizations may lead those residents who are better off financially to move out of the 
neighborhood, thus continuing to concentrate the most disadvantaged communities into urban 
areas marked by structural social disorganization and cultural isolation. Lastly, businesses and 
investors might also shy away from these areas, as they are not seen as a potential for economic 
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Conscious Political Decisions and the War on Drugs   
In this study, the war on drugs is conceptualized both as an historic and contemporary 
macro structural force responsible for isolating minorities into communities marked by structural 
social disorganization and cultural isolation. While drug use has been a part of society across 
continents and generations, public consciousness about drugs has been largely shaped by public 
policy heavily influenced by racial politics (Reddington & Bonham, 2012). Drug scares have 
acted as perfect scapegoats, they are moral panics often construed as responsible for an array of 
preexisting social problems. Moreover, racial minorities and immigrants have always been the 
target of drug laws and the enforcement of such. Rainarman (1989) argues that drug scares and 
the creation of repressive laws have nothing to do with crime, rather they are used as a political 
maneuver to deflect attention from pressing issues and attain political goals at the expense of the 
most disadvantaged groups of the population. Three broad drug scares will be discussed below to 
provide the reader with some background on the processes by which drug scares emerge. 
The first drug scare was over opium, leading to America’s first real drug law, the 1875 
San Francisco anti-opium den ordinance. Although opiates had long been widely and legally 
available without a prescription in various potions and elixirs (Musto, 1973), smoking opium 
was specific to Chinese immigrants. Opiate use or addiction was not a concern for lawmakers, 
rather the ordinance focused exclusively on the “Mongolian Vice” or opium smoking by Chinese 
immigrants in dens. Chinese immigrants came to California as cheap labor to build the railroads 
and dig the gold mines, the practice of smoking opium came along with them. Once the railroads 
were completed and the gold reserves were dwindling, Chinese immigrants became a threat to 
white Americans in the decade long depression that followed. The white Workingsman’s Party 
provoked racial hatred toward these immigrants, who were deemed responsible for the social ills 
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at the time. Hence the criminalization of opium dens was the first of many laws enacted to harass 
and control Chinese immigrants, who were seen as a threat to the economic wellbeing of white 
Americans (Morgan, 1978). The first drug law had more to do with a general context of 
recession, class conflict, and racism than concerns over public health or the control of vice 
(Reddington & Bonham, 2012; Morgan, 1978). 
The second drug scare was perhaps one of the biggest. Temperance Movement leaders 
constructed this scare in the late 18th to early 19th century against alcohol use, portraying the 
substance as being responsible for societal decay and in need of restriction (Alcohol was 
portrayed as causing violence, family breakdown, poor job performance, etc…). The passage of 
the national prohibition act in 1919 had little to do with actual alcohol drinking, rather it 
stemmed out of a threat felt by middle class suburban Protestants over the working class, 
Catholic immigrants who were filling up American cities during a time of industrialization. 
Gustfield (1963) termed Catholic immigrants as “unrepentant deviants”, who drank constantly 
despite social norms condoning it. The rhetoric during the prohibition was more representative of 
a cultural conflict in which people behind the temperance movement attempted to establish their 
morality as the dominant one in America. The temperance movement leaders instilled the fear 
that bars where alcohol was consumed served as the breeding grounds for all sorts of immoral 
behaviors at the time (Workers seeking to form unions and anarchist seeking to recruit 
supporters). For example, corporate leaders at the time funded the temperance movement in 
efforts to control working class drinking that was thought to affect productivity, along with 
concerns over unionizing (Rumbarger, 1989). Once again, alcohol served as a scapegoat for most 
of the existing social problems (poverty, crime, and moral deviance). 
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The drug scares of the early 20th century focused on opiates, marihuana, and cocaine 
(especially crack cocaine), and led to several anti-drug laws at the federal level. Again, these 
scares had more to do with class and racial conflicts, pressing social issues surrounding the labor 
market and the economy, than the actual dangers associated with these drugs (Reddington & 
Bonham, 2012). During the great depression, Harry Anslinger (head of the Federal Narcotics 
Bureau) pressured Congress into passing a federal law against marihuana, claiming it was a 
“killer weed” which incited violence among Mexican Americans. These claims were never 
evaluated and marihuana was criminalized in 1937 (Musto, 1973). During the 1960s political and 
moral leaders re-branded the “killer weed” as the “drop out drug” that was leading America’s 
youth to rebellion and deviance (Himmelstein, 1983). Although the marihuana scare was initially 
directed towards Mexican immigrants and Mexican Americans, it morphed into the perfect 
scapegoat for a multi-faceted political and cultural conflict between generations, that is, younger 
generations were revolting against conventional values. The scare resulted in the Comprehensive 
Drug Abuse Control Act of 1970, which is responsible for the current scheduling of drugs 
(Reddington & Bonham, 2012).  
Despite the fact that the prevalence of cocaine use quadrupled in the late 1970s, the crack 
cocaine scare began when crack emerged only in a handful of major urban cities (Reinarman & 
Levine, 1989a). In 1986, politicians and the media linked crack cocaine to rampant unruliness 
and violence in inner-city, minority enclaves. Politicians were quick to claim that crack 
contained special properties making its users incredibly violent and powerful. Politicians also 
linked crack to rampant abuses on welfare benefits by mothers who abandoned kids and used 
their benefits to purchase more crack (Jordan-Zachery, 2003). The response to the crack scare 
came in the form of the Anti-Abuse Act of 1986, and the Omnibus Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 
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both acts triggered massive new allocation of funds to fight the war on drugs. The acts enhanced 
mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses, established a 100:1 ratio for crack cocaine 
offenses in which 5 grams of crack triggered the same mandatory sentence as 500 grams of 
cocaine (Sirin, 2011). Both acts increased funding for law enforcement agencies, which deployed 
aggressive tactics aimed at seeking and arresting drug offenders at any cost. The rhetoric at the 
time also fueled calls for more aggressive tactics in dealing with drugs and violence which 
concentrated in minority urban enclaves. 
In each of these scares, more repressive and draconian laws were passed to deal with 
constructed drug problems. Although politicians claimed that these laws would reduce drug use 
and drug problems no experts were consulted in drafting these laws, unsurprisingly, no evidence 
has been found supporting these claims after the implementation of these policies (Tonry, 1995; 
Mauer, 1999, Clear, 2007). However, these laws were able to greatly increase the quantity and 
quality of social control directed towards groups perceived as dangerous and threatening. Drug 
scares have been placed as a mainstream issue thanks to media magnification, in which the 
media recrafts worst case scenarios into typical cases to augment the scope of the problem. As 
argued by Becker (1963), moral entrepreneurs, those who define and enforce the rules at any 
cost, are often political elites who have interests of their own in defining the problem and 
drafting an appropriate response. Political elites use drugs as a functional evil, allowing them to 
deflect attention from problems for which they would have to take some responsibility otherwise, 
or be held accountable. Furthermore, being tough on drugs and crime for that matter, allows 
politicians to take a firm stand without losing any votes or political contributions, regardless of 
how absurd that stand might be or the consequences that follow (Becker, 1963; Rainarman, 
1989; Tonry, 1995; Mauer, 1999). Hence, there has been no serious discussion on the social 
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consequences of the tough on crime movement, nor the fiscal implications of such outside of 
academia and the social sciences.  
The lack of a serious attempt at creating or implementing federal urban policy since early 
in the Carter administration came as the result of lack of importance of the city electorate (Goetz, 
1996; Kaplan, 1995; McLain, 1995). The diminished importance of cities in terms of national 
policy agenda came partially as a result of the irrelevance of cities in national elections. For 
example, only 12% of the 1984 presidential votes came from large cities (Kaplan, 1995). The 
administrations of Reagan and Bush have largely ignored the needs of cities, placing the needs of 
US corporations and businesses as a top priority (Hackworth, 2007; Harvey, 2005). This led 
policy makers to ignore cities as valuable in terms of cultural, social, or economic units, rather 
the focus was on how these cities contributed to the national economy, or their potential for 
economic output (Robertson & Judd, 1989). While major urban redevelopment programs have 
been cut (federal housing and economic development), federal assistance facilitated the 
movement of capital and population out of old cities into more productive areas (Squires, 1993; 
Rich, 1993). The social ills that followed this massive disinvestment were blamed on the 
behavioral problems of people living in these areas. Public discourse on urban problems 
followed this trend, resulting in massive investments in the form of social control, not actual 
social programs (Goetz, 1996).  
The war on drugs has brought criminalization to urban areas masked as revitalization 
efforts. As other drug scares, most of the social ills faced in urban areas were blamed on the 
availability of drugs, drug use and addiction, and the drug trade itself, not the social ills which 
preceded these problems. Another way to think of this would be that the symptoms of a disease 
were blamed for the causes of the disease not the other way around; and while the symptoms can 
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be managed, unless the causes of the disease are treated, symptoms will reappear sooner or later. 
This ensures a vicious cycle in which the causes of a problem are ignored while directing all 
attention towards symptoms, which can serve to exacerbate the causes. Therefore, the 
government was able to cut most if not all social programs and replace them with law 
enforcement and community policing programs, sold as a comprehensive new approach to urban 
renewal (Goetz, 1996). One example of this strategy is the weed and seed programs, in which 
police forces were to weed out destructive forces in these cities (i.e. anyone involved with drugs) 
and seed or establish social programs to cultivate acceptable social behaviors and practices. One 
special feature of the program was to establish law enforcement zones in which offenders would 
receive more stringent federal charges if arrested (Goetz, 1996). At the outset of the program, the 
legislation called for 80% of funds to be allocated to seeding and 20% to weeding out. However, 
upon implementation of the weed and seed programs across the nation, this allocation ratio 
reversed leaving communities at the mercy of eager police departments looking to weed out 
problems. Furthermore, in hopes of revitalizing the area, residents in these neighborhoods faced 
stiffer sentences in the name of urban renewal (Goetz, 1996; McLain, 1995). 
Indeed, the scale of the criminal justice response, public fear about crime and drug abuse 
among US residents and politicians bears no relationship to the magnitude of the actual crime 
problem (Sharp, 1994). Legislative viciousness in the name of public safety has torn minority 
communities apart and divided the country along racial lines. Chamliss (1994) and Becket (1994) 
argue that policy efforts to address the drug problems cannot be explained by public opinion nor 
a rise in the crime problem, rather these policies have emerged as a conscious political strategy 
by politicians. These issues are maintained in the public spotlight through constant media 
reinforcement (Petersilia, 1992), regardless of the actual problem. This is a great strategy for 
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politicians to run as tough on crime and mobilize the white electorate who feel the urge to back 
the candidate who is determined to address these issues at any cost (Gordon, 1994). Once again, 
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Deterrence Theory  
Policies developed in the past four decades to address the crime and drug problem in 
America have been based on deterrence theory and incapacitation. In the simplest terms, 
deterrence theory is based on the belief that prior to committing a crime, the potential offender 
weighs the perceived gains and consequences from committing crimes. Following this reasoning, 
the offender is perceived as a rational individual who engages in a cost-benefit evaluation prior 
to any act of delinquency, thus crime is seen as a rational choice. (Kubrin et al, 2009). 
Incapacitation refers to preventing someone from committing a crime through incarceration. To 
achieve this, the state has to incapacitate an offender through their active offending years, 
roughly from 15 to 29 years of age (Kubrin et al, 2009). Based on this theoretical framework, the 
policies passed under the umbrella of the war on drugs offer some face validity. However, upon 
close examination, this face validity and simplistic reasoning fades away. 
One cannot ignore the relationship between incarceration and crime, whether it be 
positive or negative. A relationship supportive of incapacitation and deterrence theory would 
have to be an inverse relationship, that is as incarceration and tougher sentences become more 
prevalent, the crime rate should (in theory) decrease. However, the available evidence on 
incarceration and crime does not follow said logic. For example, while the US prison population 
began to rise in 1973, and continued to rise every year thereafter, crime rates have not followed a 
consistent pattern. In 1972, the rate of state level imprisonment grew from just under 84 per 
100,000 citizens to 432 per 100,000 residents in 2004, this represents a 400% increase in the rate 
of imprisonment. Crime rates as measured by the FBI crime index on the other hand experienced 
a 3 percent increase in the same time period (Clear, 2007). There is a clear disconnect between 
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incarceration and crime prevention, so the relationship between punishment and crime is not as 
simple as stated by incapacitation or deterrence theory advocates.  
A sensible observer should wonder how the United States has sustained a growth in 
imprisonment for the last 40 years, without a stable effect on crime. Blumstein and Beck (2005) 
have argued that this growth in imprisonment can be broken down into three different periods. 
The 1970s experienced an increase in incarceration of 40% with a similar increase in crime of 
50%, during this period most of the increase in incarceration was due to crime, or justified by the 
crime problem. The 1980s began and ended with about the same crime rate, dropping during the 
first 4 years and returning to its 1980 level by 1991. However, the incarceration rate more than 
doubled, from 140 to 310 residents per 100,000. As Blumstein and Beck (2005) argued, this was 
fueled by the increased likelihood of offenders going to prison on a drug felony. Lastly, during 
the 1990s the prison populations experienced an increase of about 80% (between 1990 and 
2000), while the crime rate was steadily dropping at a rate of about 30%. Blumstein and Beck 
conclude that between 1980 and 2001: 
Growth in incarceration is attributable first to the 10-fold increase since 1980 in 
incarceration rates for drug offenses. Beyond drugs, no contribution to that increase is 
associated with increases in crime rate or increases in police effectiveness as measured by 
arrests per crime. Rather, the entire growth is attributable to sentencing broadly defined – 
roughly equally to increases in commitments to prison per arrest… and to increases in 
time served in prison, including time served for parole violation (2005:50).  
 
The periods described by Blumstein and Beck show no stable pattern as one would 
expect taking deterrence and incapacitation into consideration. If deterrence was at work, one 
could expect fewer people engaging in drug crimes during this period of time, and if 
incapacitation was at work, people committed to prison would be younger, as this is how 
incapacitation works. On the first point, arrest for drug crimes not only failed to decrease, they 
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actually experienced a five-fold increase between 1970 and 2004 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
2006). On the later point, the average age of prison commitments actually rose in the same 
period of time, especially for those who received long mandatory sentences (Clear, 2007; Mauer, 
King, & Young, 2004; BJS, 2006). One would also expect lower recidivism rates as sentencing 
guidelines called for tougher sentences for repeat offenders.  Again, the evidence does not 
support this claim. In fact in 1983, 62% of offenders released from prison would get rearrested 
within 3 years, and in 1994 the recidivism rate had grown to 68% (Hughes, Wilson, & Beck, 
2006). From the evidence available, deterrence and incapacitation have not been effective in 
controlling crime, never mind reducing crime. In fact, the war on drugs has served to exacerbate 
the problems it intended to address. 
Some researchers argue that the public health consequences of our nation’s drug control 
efforts are an important area of research. For example, Drucker (1999) along with Duncan (1994) 
analyzed whether drug law enforcement had a negative effect on public health outcomes. Both 
studies found that enforcement strategies are exacerbating the negative public health 
consequences of illicit drug use by demonstrating an increase in emergency room visits and fatal 
drug overdoses. Drucker (1999) noted that during the 1980s and 1990s when resources for drug 
law enforcement increased dramatically, the death and public health outcomes associated with 
drugs rose dramatically in urban areas with large minority populations (p.15). Furthermore, 
Duncan (1994) found a statistically significant relationship between drug law enforcement 
expenditures and drug-induced deaths, noting that the evidence “does not support the view that 
the enforcement of drug laws protects the public health” (p.226). Although the war on drugs was 
supposed to eradicate drug use and the ills associated with such, it has actually exacerbated 
negative public health consequences of drug use.  
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For example, one of the most notorious drug policies is the federal ban on needle 
exchange programs. Day (2002) studied the spread of drug related aids and hepatitis C among 
African Americans and Latinos. She found that more than 165,000 African Americans and 
96,000 Latinos were living with injection related aids or had already died from it by 2001. This 
did not include the thousands more who were infected by the virus in this period. Among those 
who inject drugs African Americans are 5 times as likely as Whites to get AIDS and Latinos are 
at least 1.5 times as likely as whites to get AIDS. Even more disturbing is the fact that despite all 
the medical advances in AIDS treatment by the year 2000, AIDS was still among the top 3 
leading causes of death for African Americans aged 25-54 years, and among the top 5 for 
Latinos of the same age group. More than half of those deaths were caused by contaminated 
needles (Day, 2002). This policy is regarded as a gross disregard for human dignity and human 
lives by many human rights organizations (Bowen, 2012).  
More recently, Shepard and Blackley (2004) evaluated the relationship among federal 
anti-drug law enforcement expenditures, education and treatment expenditures with public health 
outcomes. Using data from 1981 to 1998, they found that increased expenditures for drug control 
strategies as opposed to expenditures for treatment and education were statistically associated 
with drug induced deaths. They noted that a 10% reduction in enforcement expenditures is 
associated with a long run reduction of approximately 3,000 deaths per year. Their results are 
consistent with the literature evaluating drug enforcement and public health outcomes. 
Furthermore, results supported the hypotheses advanced by Friedman (1998), Nadelman (1988), 
and Drucker (1999) which state that an increase in expenditures for drug control strategies will 
have an adverse effect on public health outcomes and drug induced deaths. These adverse public 
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health outcomes are also found to concentrate among African Americans, whether it be the 
number of deaths or age adjusted mortality rates.  
Seeking to measure the impact of community oriented policing services (COPS) grants 
on rates of police productivity (arrest), Zhao et al. (2011) used city level data from 1990 to 2000. 
Between 1994 and 2000, COPS grants awarded more than $ 7 billion in grants to local law 
enforcement agencies to hire new police officers focusing on quality of life issues such as 
loitering, public drinking and drug dealing. Using a two-level hierarchical multivariate linear 
module (HMLM) for the longitudinal data analysis, Zhao et al. (2011) found the COPS grants to 
be associated with increased arrests in the most disadvantaged communities. Furthermore, while 
arrests for property crimes experienced a modest increase, the most rapid and considerable 
increase in arrests were for drug offenses. The findings are consistent with the literature on 
police strength. In several studies, findings demonstrate a positive relationship between police 
strength (number of police officers) and crime incidents (see Jacobs & Helms, 1997; Levitt, 
1997; Marvell & Moody, 1996).  However, the literature consistently shows a significant 
statistical relationship between drug law enforcement and drug market violence. Thus, an 
increase in COPS grants aimed at reducing violence and disorder in disadvantaged urban areas 
may be counterproductive. 
Werb and colleagues (2011), embarked in a systematic review of the literature in order to 
analyze the effects of drug law enforcement on drug market violence. Using the Preferred 
Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines, 15 studies 
were identified that evaluated the impact of drug law enforcement on drug market violence. 
While the studies used a variety of research designs and statistical techniques, (11 longitudinal 
analysis using linear regression, 2 mathematical drug market models, and 2 qualitative studies) 
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the majority of studies concluded that drug law enforcement had an adverse effect on drug 
market violence (Werb et al., 2011). The findings suggest that increasing drug law enforcement 
activities actually increase drug market violence. These findings call into question the standard 
governmental approach toward drug related problems, which is more funding to increase 
enforcement strategies. Thus, empirical research on drug enforcement and its effects on violence 
and public health outcomes raises some serious questions about the current approach towards 
drugs, its related problems, and governmental legitimacy in the eyes of minority individuals who 
see the war on drugs as unfair by design (Mauer, 1999; Tonry, 1995; Bobo & Thomson, 2006). 
Catalyst for Structural and Cultural Social Disorganization  
Although drug use is widely distributed across the population, drug law enforcement and 
the negative consequences it brings are concentrated in large urban communities comprised 
mainly of minority individuals. The discretionary nature of drug law enforcement left 
disadvantaged urban communities vulnerable to over enforcement of drug laws by police 
departments pressured to show results on the war on drugs (Mauer, 1999). As a result, many 
black communities experienced an unprecedented increase in rates of imprisonment. Pettit and 
Western (2004) argue that among the age cohort of 30-34 in 1999, 60 percent of black men 
without a high school diploma had been incarcerated at some point, a threefold increase for the 
same cohort before the war on drugs. Moreover, drug law enforcement activities contribute to 
family breakdown, often leaving children behind in the child welfare system, creating massive 
disfranchisement for those with felonies, and prohibiting ex-convicts from receiving social 
services such as welfare, food stamps, and access to public housing. This has great consequences 
for the family and community structure of African Americans. For example, African American 
children are 9 times more likely to have a parent incarcerated than white children (ACLU, 2006). 
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African American males are disfranchised at a rate that is 7 times the national average; and as a 
result of other legislation addressing drug offenders, there is a lifetime disqualification from the 
receipt of welfare for anyone convicted of a drug felony, unless states opt out of this provision 
(ACLU, 2006). This means that people who need these services the most to stay afloat and 
reintegrate into society are left with no support or means to do so. 
Racial disparity linked to proactive enforcement of drug laws and the application of 
mandatory minimum sentences for crack cocaine is quite disturbing. For example, despite the 
fact that whites and Hispanics form the majority of crack users, African Americans comprise the 
majority of those convicted for crack cocaine offenses (Sirin, 2011). In 1980, the black arrest rate 
for drug possession or use was about twice the white arrest rate, and by 1989 it had increased to 
4 black arrest for every 1 white arrest (ACLU, 2006; BJS, 2012). In the same period, the white 
arrest rate for drug possession or use increased 56% compared to a 219% increase for blacks 
(BJS, 2012). The disparities were even greater for African American women who experienced an 
800% increase in incarceration rates between 1986 and 2006 (ACLU, 2006). Overall, while 
arrest rates for murder, forcible rape, larceny-theft, gun law violations declined from 1990 to 
2010, overall drug arrest rates increased by 80% in the same period of time (BJS, 2012).  
Disparate incarceration rates in disadvantaged urban communities are also coupled with 
disparate violent victimization of its residents. For example, by 1990 black women and men were 
four and six times more likely than their white counterparts to be murdered in their lifetime 
(Reiss & Roth 1993, p.63). In 1995, the leading cause of death among black males and females 
between the ages of 15 and 24 was homicide (National Center for Health Statistics, 1995). 
Because these forces concentrate in poor, minority, urban cities, the ripple effect caused can be 
very disruptive, which in term can affect social networks, local ties and informal social control. 
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Labor Markets and Poverty  
The most crippling effects of incarceration are the lifelong consequences of having a 
criminal record in terms of employment and income. For example Mauer states that “An 18-
year-old with a first time felony conviction for drug possession now may be barred from 
receiving welfare for life, prohibited from living in public housing, denied student loans to attend 
college, permanently excluded from voting, and if not a citizen, be deported” (2005, p.610). 
Adding to this hardship, states place additional restrictions on employment for those with a 
criminal record, especially those with a drug related conviction. For example, in New York, there 
are 283 employment restrictions for those with records (Clear, 2007). This limits the dim 
prospects people living in these urban areas already have in terms of finding employment, never 
mind rejoining the labor force after a prison sentence. Moreover, once released from prison 
young men of color keep facing hardships related to probation and or parole. For example, for 
those in the community under the supervision of probation or parole, states have increased the 
practice of regular drug testing, sometimes placing a supervision fee on parolees to cover for 
this. This creates a semi-permanent prison population who cycle in and out of these urban areas 
(Clear, 2007; Blumstein & Beck, 2005). Furthermore, the impositions of fees while on parole is 
placing the cost of social control on those who are targeted the most, increasing the financial 
burden of incarceration even when it is over. 
For people who see their family members and neighbors caught up in this vicious cycle 
of state crime control, visiting these family members and maintaining contact while they are in 
prison can become an enormous financial strain. Family members earning money contribute to 
the financial stability of their family, whether the source of income is legal or comes from the 
drug trade. For example, Edin and Lein (1997) show that in order to sustain their families, 
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mothers rely on regular and substantial financial help from people in their networks, because 
neither welfare nor available jobs provide sufficient cash to cover their expenses. The study 
points to 55% of mothers receiving cash from their families and networks, and 41% receiving 
cash from their child’s father. Thus, cycling residents of these communities through the criminal 
justice system on drug charges can put families at great economic disadvantage.  
Lastly, the concentration of drug law enforcement and incarceration in these communities 
impede access to jobs for youths because it decreases the pool of men who can serve as mentors 
and link them to the labor force. This process can generate a sort of employment discrimination 
against entire communities (Roberts, 2004). Also, an extended reliance on welfare, and a lack of 
work and life experiences can remove residents from mainstream society and the opportunities it 
affords (Roberts, 2004; Browne, 1997). Wide-spread poverty and unemployment also affect the 
few businesses that operate in these communities given that purchases of products and services 
are reliant on the availability of resources. Indeed, the erosion of local labor markets is a 
precursor for higher rates of crime. As presented in previous sections, economic hardship is one 
of the strongest predictors of crime rates. The socially imbedded nature of crime, unemployment, 
and incarceration ensures and or leaves residents with no other option than to engage in crime to 
survive, and settle disputes (Clear, 2007; Hagan, 1993). Furthermore, these economic hardships 
affect the availability and sustainability of informal social controls and local ties in the 
community. 
Families  
Perhaps as many as 700,000 US families have a loved one behind bars on any given day 
(Clear, 2007). Because drug law enforcement and incarceration primarily removes young men 
from these communities, the rate of single female headed households is higher than other areas 
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without the same phenomena, or areas that are predominantly white (Clear, 2007). For example, 
in 1986, of the 28.6 million African American households, 50% were headed by single females 
(Williams, 1993). This means that women and their children are increasingly and consistently 
forced into poverty and state dependency, something which clearly does not promote emotional 
well-being nor harmony among family members. On the simplest grounds, the removal of a 
father creates negative feelings for their significant other and their children. Anecdotal accounts, 
show that in these communities there is a feeling of desperation, things are the way they are and 
nothing will change. For these families, the removal of a father, brother, uncle or cousin is 
almost an expected occurrence in their lifetime, hence, the financial difficulties that follow are 
also an expected occurrence (see Clear, 2007). 
Murray (2005) provides a review of close to a dozen studies evaluating the effects of 
male incarceration on the family unit he left behind. He notes that one of the most prominent 
effects is extreme financial hardship, caused by the removal of financial support from the 
incarcerated partner along with the expenses associated with maintaining ties with the father. It is 
estimated that the number of children with a parent in prison run as high as 2.3 million, this 
represents almost 3-5% of children under the age of 18 (Clear, 2007). Among black children, 
roughly one fifth have a parent with a history of incarceration, and the figure goes up to 33% 
among those children with fathers who did not finish high school (Murray, 2005). Murray and 
Farrington, (2008) conducted a systematic review of studies looking at how incarceration affects 
children. The study shows that parental incarceration is a risk factor for later delinquency, and 
having a parent incarcerated makes children 3 to 4 times more likely to develop a juvenile 
record. The strict reliance on incarceration without establishing clear guidelines and programs 
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for successful re-integration into the community after a prison sentence, ensures that people from 
these communities will return sooner or later, making freedom an almost unattainable goal.  
Previous research suggests that communities with high levels of family disruption 
experience a weakening of formal and voluntary organizations, which in turn play a crucial role 
in socializing youth to other social institutions (Sampson, 1986a, 1986b). As Kornhauser, (1978) 
argues, in these communities “the messages and methods of the various institutions with which 
the child has contact are conflicting and uncoordinated” (p.81). Sampson and Groves (1989) 
argue that high levels of family disruption may decrease community networks of informal social 
control which are responsible for supervising general youth activities and intervening in case of 
disturbances. Bloom (1966) found that areas with high family disruption had low rates of 
participation in community politics, along with recreation and educational activities such as 
YMCA and library memberships. Lastly, Kellam and colleagues (1982) found that single-parent 
mothers in a Chicago slum were less likely to participate in social and political organizations 
than two-parent families in the same community. In these communities, affiliation to the few 
local institutions that provide social control are hindered by the prevalence of single headed 
female households. In the simplest terms, having only one person to sustain a household, leaves 
the head of the household without much time to engage in social activities, given that the head of 
that household is responsible for things such as food-shopping, cooking, cleaning, etc…  
Areas with high prevalence of family disruption also experience attenuated informal 
social controls (Sampson, 1986b, 1987; Felson & Cohen, 1980). Examples of informal social 
control include neighbors being able to identify strangers in the community and question them, 
watching over resident’s property, and supervising local youth activities (Sampson & Groves, 
1989). In simplest terms, having only one parent present in most households makes it harder for 
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people in the neighborhood to watch over other people’s kids and property. As Felson (1986) 
argues “The single parent household gives the community only one parent to know and hence 
reduces the potential linkages which can be invoked for informal social control” (p.124). The 
concentration of drug law enforcement activities in predominately poor and minority 
communities ensures that young minority males will be incarcerated, producing high levels of 
family disruption. In turn, informal and formal social control networks are diminished and crime 
and delinquency flourish.  
Neighborhood Isolation  
In an effort to combat street crime and drugs, many police departments and community 
organizations across the country have engaged in an aggressive inter-agency assault on drug 
trafficking and drug use. In the 1990s, local law enforcement agencies combined drug 
enforcement operations with housing inspections as a pragmatic approach to clean up 
neighborhoods (Goetz, 1996). For example, in St. Paul Minneapolis, the city council formed the 
FORCE (Focusing Our Resources for Community Empowerment) program in 1992. The team 
conducted widespread outreach, going door to door on neighborhoods deemed problematic by 
law enforcement (primarily low income, and minority neighborhoods) conducting drug raids and 
a housing inspection immediately after the raid. This allowed the city to condemn the unit and 
force the eviction of a household regardless of the result of the drug raid. By having a housing 
inspector in the FORCE team, city officials were able to essentially evict anyone due to the low 
eviction threshold which was usually met by drug raids themselves. For example, drug units 
conducting a drug raid usually enter the house with force, breaking doors, windows, tipping 
furniture over, etc... These are all triggers used to condemn a housing unit and evict residents 
regardless of the presence of illegal narcotics (Goetz, 1996).  
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In St. Paul alone, from October 1992 through the end of 1994, the FORCE team 
conducted 424 raids, averaging just under 16 raids per month (Goetz, 1996). Much like the war 
on drugs, the raids were concentrated in poor minority neighborhoods. Although African 
Americans comprised less than 10% of St. Paul’s population, 93% of the raids were conducted in 
African American households. Moreover, these households were 14 times more likely than 
households of all other races combined to be targets of these raids. Of these raids, 55% resulted 
in condemnations, forcing households out of the unit in less than 24 hours (Goetz, 1996). While 
these condemnations remove everyone from the household regardless of culpability, less than 
half of the raids resulted in any arrests. Thus, initiatives aimed at increasing public safety in the 
name of drug control were arbitrarily and proactively removing minority residents from 
communities that were valuable to other residents. As stated by the commander of the FORCE 
unit himself “The whole philosophy behind the unit is to move [the drug dealing]. What you 
have to understand is that I only want to move it outside city limits. Let them go to Roseville or 
Maplewood, I don’t care as long as it isn’t in the city of St. Paul” (Graves, 1993 as cited in 
Goetz, 1996).  
Unfortunately St Paul was not the only city using these tactics, in 1995 a survey of the 30 
largest US cities revealed that 77% had programs in which drug units combined forces with 
housing inspectors and other agencies (Goetz, 1996). This tactic along other war-like tactics have 
been used in large cities in the name of drug control without having much tangible effects in 
terms of drug seizures. For decades now, the federal government has equipped state and local 
law enforcement agencies with military weapons and vehicles. Police militarization has resulted 
in tragedies to civilians and police officers, it escalated the risks of violence in the underground 
drug market, caused destruction of personal property and undermined civil liberties for the 
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purpose of drug control (ACLU, 2014). In a 2014 study conducted by the ACLU, researchers 
noted that when SWAT teams or paramilitary tactics were deployed in drug searchers, the 
primary targets were people of color, whereas when paramilitary tactics were used in a hostage 
or barricade scenarios, the primary targets were white [a much more suitable occasion for these 
tactics]. Again, most of the time, these searches do not produce anything other than terrified 
residents. For example, in 54% of the cases in which the SWAT team forced an entry into a 
person’s home using a battering ramp or breaching device the SWAT team either did not or 
probably did not find any weapons (ACLU, 2014). When SWAT teams and other drug units are 
aggressively deployed to these disadvantaged communities, a feeling of isolation and vengeance 
are nothing but inevitable among residents. Military tactics emphasizing force are for enemies of 
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Chapter 3 
Data and Methods 
This cross sectional study is an empirical test of Sampson and Wilson’s (1995) thesis, 
which states that “macro structural factors” or conscious political decisions are responsible for 
the disproportionate consignment of African Americans to inner-city neighborhoods that are 
plagued by a concentration of poverty and family disruption, which are known correlates of 
social disorganization and crime (Sampson, 1987; Sampson & Groves, 1989). The study 
conceptualizes drug law enforcement activities as both historic and contemporary conscious 
political decisions. The research questions guiding the study read as follow, (1) What is the 
relationship between drug law enforcement activities and structural antecedents of social 
disorganization theory (poverty, family disruption, residential instability, and residential 
segregation) in cities with 250,000 residents or more? (2) What is the relationship between drug 
law enforcement activities and violent crime rates in cities with 250,000 residents or more? My 
hypotheses are as follow: (1) As drug law enforcement activities increase, structural antecedents 
of social disorganization will increase, and (2) As consistent with the literature, as structural 
determinants of social disorganization increase, violent crime rates will increase. 
In order to empirically test the argument and test my hypotheses, I have constructed a 
data set using data from the County and City Data book, and the Summary Population and 
Housing characteristics of the U.S. Census Bureau (2001, 2003). Information on violent crime 
rates, homicide, and non- negligent manslaughter are taken from the data collected by the FBI in 
the Uniform Crime Reports for 2000. Information on police department employees and officers 
were also taken from the FBI UCR data tool for the year 2000. Data on city level law 
enforcement expenditures and the number of police employees assigned to drug units were taken 
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from the 2000 Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics for Individual State 
and local Agencies with 100 or more officers (2004). The original sample in this study consisted 
of 71 cities with populations of 250,000 or more, however after removing cities without all the 
information necessary to conduct the analysis, the final sample consists of 63 cities. 
I will use multivariate regression analysis (MRA) as the analytical technique for my 
models, consistent with various studies of social inquiry (Peterson & Krivo, 2000; Kovandzic et 
al. 1998, Borg & Parker, 2001; Miethe et al. 1991; Ousey & Lee, 2004, 2008; Kent & 
Carmichael, 2013). MRA is an extension of simple linear regression. It is often used in social 
inquiries because it allows researchers to make predictive statements about a phenomenon 
(dependent variable) based on the value of two or more variables, hence multiple regression. It 
also allows researchers to determine the overall fit of the model and the relative contribution of 
each of the predictors (IV) on the overall variance (Allison, 1999).  
In order to analyze data using MRA, one ought to check to make sure that the data can 
actually be analyzed. The data being used must meet 8 assumptions. (1) The dependent variable 
must be measured on a continuous scale, (2) there has to be at least two or more independent 
variables, either continuous or categorical, (3) there needs to be an independence of observation, 
(4) there needs to be a linear relationship between the dependent variable and each of the 
independent variables, (5) the data needs to show homoscedasticity, (6) your data must not show 
multicollinearity, (7) there should be no significant outliers, high leverage points or highly 
influential points , and finally (8) the residuals (error) should be approximately normally 
distributed (Allison, 1999). All the data in this study is measured at the continuous level. 
Furthermore, an initial scatterplot of the standard error coefficients or residuals indicated that the 
errors are random and normally distributed, thus abiding by all 8 assumptions of MRA. 
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Unit of Analysis  
The decision to use cities with 250,000 residents or more as the unit of analysis comes 
after careful consideration of the literature on homicide, drug market violence, and social 
disorganization. While previous homicide studies have utilized states as the unit of analysis 
(Smith & Parker, 1980), aggregation at the state level can include vastly different ecological 
units. For example, the state of Illinois is home to large cities like Chicago with close to 3 
million residents and small towns like Adair, with less than 300 people. Because of this 
variability, researchers have discontinued the use of states as unit of analysis (see Messner 1982; 
Parker, 1989). The same criticism applies to the use of SMSAs (standard metropolitan statistical 
areas) as unit of analysis in studies of crime. For example, Parker (1989) argues that homicide is 
largely a central city problem, and Kovanzic and colleagues (1998) demonstrate that for SMSAs 
with 100 homicides or more, 76% occur in the largest central cities. Thus, states and SMSAs 
would be inappropriate levels of aggregations to explore the relationship between drug law 
enforcement, social disorganization, and crime.  
Using cities as the unit of analysis is consistent with the literature on ecological theories 
of crime (Sampson, 1986, 1987; Krivo & Peterson, 1993, 2000; Messner & Golden, 1992; Parker 
and McCall 1997). Doing so, also allows for greater comparability with other studies of crime, 
and the data is more plentiful at this level of aggregation. Researchers exploring the relationship 
between drug law enforcement and drug market violence tend to use counties (Benson et al., 
1998, 2001; Shepard et al., 2005) and cities (Brumm, 1995; Resignato, 2000). I select cities with 
250,000 residents or more as the unit of analysis for three reasons. First, the war on drugs has 
been predominantly fought across the nation’s largest cities. Tonry (1995) states, that the war on 
drugs began an era of targeting the urban and disproportionately Black population of American 
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largest urban centers. For example, in New York City alone the number of drug arrests rose by 
70,000 between 1980 and 1988 (Belenko, Fagan, & Chin, 1991). Second, the ecological 
landscape of large urban areas may create important structures (i.e. open air drug markets) that 
may render offenders to be more vulnerable to proactive and zealous enforcement of drug laws 
(Mauer, 1999; Tonry, 1995). Lastly, since 1960s poverty has become more concentrated in large 
cities, where almost three-fourth of poor people reside (Kovandzic et al., 1998; Sampson, 1987). 
Therefore, the use of cities with 250,000 people or more is empirically, conceptually, and 
theoretically justified.  
Dependent Variables  
Wilson (1987) and Sampson and Wilson (1995) have argued that high rates of violence in 
cities come as a result of the concentration of disadvantage and community instability. The 
dependent variables in this study seek to measure the concentration of disadvantage and 
community instability consistent with social disorganization theory. The focus will be placed on 
racial residential segregation, community instability, family disruption, and levels of poverty. 
Residential segregation, as argued by Massey and Denton (1993) is a structural cause of crime 
because it serves as a precursor to concentrated disadvantage for minorities (Krivo et al. 1998, 
Peterson and Krivo, 1999). Furthermore, subcultural explanations argue that certain groups 
develop deviant or adaptive responses to socioeconomic hardships, deviant values are then 
transmitted to future generations through socialization with people who are similarly situated in 
these distressed communities (Wolfgang and Ferracuti, 1967). In order to measure the effect of 
drug law enforcement activities on levels of residential racial segregation for African Americans 
and Hispanics separately, I will include two separate variables with the index of dissimilarity 
(one for each group). 
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Racial residential segregation is measured by the index of dissimilarity. This index 
measures how evenly distributed African Americans are across census tracts in a city. Values for 
the index of dissimilarity range from 0, representing an even distribution across census tracts, to 
1, representing complete segregation across tracts. The distribution across tracts is based on the 
percentage of minorities (Black or Hispanic in the current study) in the city. For example, if 15% 
of a city’s population is black, then a measure of 0 (index of dissimilarity) will mean that the 
specific census tract is representative of the city population, or 15% black. The index of 
dissimilarity is commonly used as a measure of racial residential segregation in structural studies 
(Peterson & Krivo, 2000; Borg et al., 2001; Parker & McCall, 1999). In this study, this measure 
is provided for Blacks and Hispanics separately. 
The percentage of vacant housing units is used as a proxy measure to capture the stability 
(or instability), organization, and health of a city. This is based on empirical research linking city 
decay to levels of collective capacity (Borg and Parker, 2001). The reasoning is pretty similar to 
broken windows theory, abandoned buildings, graffiti, broken windows and trash could indicate 
potential offenders that people do not care, and that the area is in decay (Hartnett & Skogan, 
1999). Also, in order to achieve a meaningful change, residents have to come together and 
demand services and/or actions through the right venues, so lots of vacant housing units can 
signify the lack of common goals and collective efficacy in a city (Sampson et al., 1997). This 
collective capacity is affected by the people cycling through neighborhoods, and new people 
coming in and out cannot form the ties necessary to take care of these problems.  Vacant housing 
units also provide spaces without capable guardians and neighbors may be reluctant to intervene 
in the case of criminal activity since there will be a diffusion of responsibility (Sampson, 1987, 
Ousey & Lee, 2004).  
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Family disruption is measured as the percentage of female headed households with 
children under the age of 18, which is consistent with previous studies analyzing structural 
covariates of crime (Sampson, 1986, 1987; Sampson & Groves, 1989). This measurement of 
family disruption is well suited for our model which emphasizes the power of informal social 
controls and guardianship. Households with only one parent are less likely to engage in 
neighborhood activities, care for other children, and interact with other parents (Sampson & 
Groves, 1989). The last variable in our model is for poverty, which is measured as the percentage 
of the population below the social security administration’s poverty line (Peterson & Krivo, 
2000; Sampson, 1987, Wilson, 1987). This measure of poverty is consistent with previous 
studies, thus providing comparability between studies.  
Independent Variables  
Drug law enforcement in this study is operationalized with two different variables. The 
first one is the number of full time sworn employees assigned to a special drug unit in that city 
(DLE per capita 1). The second one, is the number of full time sworn employees assigned to a 
multi-agency drug task force (DLE per capita 2). These variables were converted into a per 
capita rate to better fit the model and assumptions of the study. Drug law enforcement is 
considered as a governmental policy that can affect structural determinants of social 
disorganization theory and crime. Several researchers point to the disproportionate consequences 
of drug law enforcement in urban communities. As stated by a 2006 ACLU report, “…national 
drug enforcement and prosecutorial policies and practices have resulted in inner city 
communities of color being targeted almost exclusively.” (p.7). Consequently, it affects the 
stability of predominantly minority communities by crushing labor markets, family and marriage 
prospects, financial viability, public health, public safety, and attitudes toward authorities (Clear, 
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2007; Mauer, 2000, 2004; Tonry, 1995; Murray & Farrington, 2008; Western, 2006; Braman, 
2004; Thomas & Torrone, 2006). 
Drug law enforcement is of ultimate importance in this study, because these practices are 
concentrated in poor minority communities. As Tonry argues, “ the institutional character of 
urban police departments led to a tactical focus on disadvantaged minority neighborhoods… it is 
easier to make arrests in socially disorganized neighborhoods, as contrasted with urban blue 
collar and urban or suburban white collar neighborhood (1995, p.105). He continues by shedding 
light on the fact that most daily activities of life, including drug transactions occur in the streets 
and alleys in poor communities. On the other hand, activities, including drug transactions are 
usually conducted indoors in working class and middle class neighborhoods. Thus, it is much 
easier and convenient for law enforcement agents to focus on low income neighborhoods or 
cities, than to go after actors that might be better protected by ecological features of their 
neighborhoods and/or city. 
The study focuses on the number of full time sworn police employees assigned to city 
and multi-agency drug unit for several reasons. First, drug enforcement activities/strategies are 
proactive and labor intensive in nature. For example, drug arrests come as a result of undercover 
buy-and-bust operations or field interrogations (Conlon, 2004). Second, these activities involve a 
relatively high level of police discretion when it comes time to decide whether an offender will 
be arrested or not. Other offenses (violent or property crimes) may have a lower level of police 
discretion because a complaining third party is usually involved, in which case the police is 
pressured to make an arrest (Ousey & Lee, 2008). For example, if a bloody assault victim points 
his/her finger at the assailant, the police is compelled to make an arrest. On the other hand, the 
interactions between police and a drug suspect who has been found to possess drugs is much 
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more private. Unless there’s a third party, or a crowd pointing fingers at the suspect, the officer 
can still cut him/her loose despite breaking the law (Ousey & Lee, 2008; Conlon, 2004). Lastly, 
using the number of full time sworn police employees assigned to drug units can serve as a proxy 
to measure conscious decisions by police administrators who fund and deploy these drug units 
toward distinct black communities that are perceived as hot spots for drug activities. Thus, the 
structural contexts (racial residential segregation) of major cities makes it easier for 
administrators to over police and oppress these communities (Ousey & Lee, 2008).  
Control variables  
The inclusion of control variables is based on a review of previous studies for factors that 
are most consistently found to have a theoretical and empirical relevance to homicide and violent 
crime rates (Peterson & Krivo, 2000; Kovandzic et al, 2001; Borg & Parker, 2001). Controls are 
included for the percentage of the city population that is Black (Black Model), and the 
percentage of the city population that is Hispanic (Hispanic Model). As Sampson & Groves 
(1989) argued, ethnic heterogeneity is associated with crime rates because it reduces the ability 
of residents in a city to achieve consensus regarding goals and behaviors. Studies of police 
strength and social control also find a relationship between the percentage of minority groups in 
a city and increases on police expenditures (Jackson, 1989; Nalla, Lynch, & Leiber, 1997; Kent 
& Carmichael, 2014). Intergovernmental transfers and a measure of a city’s budgetary health 
(computed as revenues/expenses) was used to control for the availability of resources in a city 
for policing and social programs. For example, between 1994 and March, 2000, community 
oriented policing services (COPS) grants awarded more than $7 billion in grants to law 
enforcement agencies, which provided funding for over 109,000 community police officers 
focusing on quality of life issues (i.e. drug use/dealing) (Zhao et al., 2011). The unemployment 
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rate is included to control for its impact on poverty and community levels of deprivation 
(Chiricos, 1987). Lastly, a control is included for the local law enforcement crime control 





















Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations for all the variables in the models as 
found in other studies in the literature (Krivo & Peterson, 2000; Borg & Parker, 2001). These 
descriptive statistics show a pattern of racial residential segregation across our sample, both for 
Blacks and Hispanics. The mean index of dissimilarity for Blacks is 55%, this means that in 
order to be evenly distributed with whites across census tracts in the sample, 55% of Black 
residents would have to move. The mean index of dissimilarity for Hispanics is 46%, this means 
that in order to be evenly distributed with whites across census tracts in the sample, 46% of 
Hispanic residents would have to move. Moreover, the mean of the population that is Black is 
22.8%, and the mean of the population that is Hispanic is 19.97%. The mean percentage of 
vacant housing units is 9.4%, and the mean percentage of people living in poverty is 18.6%. The 
mean percentage of female headed households in the sample is 59.52%, therefore in these cities 
growing up without a parent is an almost expected reality. This points to the nature of big cities 
as having highly segregated and disadvantaged areas as consistent with the literature (See 
Sampson, 1987). 
The means for the index of dissimilarity for Blacks and Hispanics support the argument 
that racial residential segregation has grown stronger each decade since 1980, and it remains a 
pervasive feature of the social landscape in many U.S. cities (Wilson, 1987; Sampson & Wilson, 
1995; Kent & Carmichael, 2014). The residential segregation of minorities has been linked to 
higher rates of infant mortality (McFarland & Smith, 2011), greater arrest rates of African 
Americans (Liska & Chamlin, 1984), an increase in the size of police departments (Kent & 
Jacobs, 2005), increased detention facilities (Carmichael, 2005), and the prison population 
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(Liska, Lawrence & Benson, 1981; Kent & Carmichael, 2014). Ousey & Lee (2008), argue that 
cities with higher levels of segregation produce opportunities for conscious or unconscious racial 
biases, which lead to disparate arrest rates for criminal offenses such as drug and weapon 
violations (pp. 330-331).  
Table 2 presents the regression results predicting rates of racial residential segregation for 
Blacks, community instability, family disruption, and poverty. The table reports the standard 
errors, standardized coefficients, t statistics, and the significance levels, which is consistent with 
other studies in the literature (Miethe et al., 1991; Pratt & Godsey, 2003).The model does not 
show a statistical significant relationship between the drug law enforcement variables and the 
levels of black residential segregation, community stability, and family disruption.  
However, the drug law enforcement variable (DLE per capita 1) shows a statistically 
significant positive relationship with the level of poverty at the .05 alpha level. This means that 
as the number of full time employees assigned to a city’s drug unit increases, the poverty rate in 
that city increases. The r square for the model is 0.637, which means that 63.7% of the variance 
in the level of poverty is explained by the model. While a statistical relationship was expected 
between the drug law enforcement variables and levels of segregation, instability, and family 
disruption, one of the drug enforcement variables is still a strong predictor of poverty in the 
Black model. Among the control variables, the percentage of people who are black show a 
statistically significant positive relationship with the level of poverty at the .001 alpha level. This 
is consistent with previous studies showing a positive relationship between percentage black and 
disadvantage. 
 







Dependent Variables  Mean Standard Deviation  
Index of Dissimilarity (Black) 0.5525 0.15246 
Index of Dissimilarity (Hispanic) 0.4551 0.10602 
Percent Vacant Housing Units  9.416 9.455 
Female Headed Households 59.52 5.65 
Poverty  18.667 5.53 
Independent Variables   
DLE per capita 1 0.0084 0.00733 
DLE per capita 2 0.0019 0.00206 
Control Variables   
Intergovernmental Transfers 643783.19 2817223.83 
City Expenditure/Revenue 687824.28 1264294.54 
Unemployment 4.47 2.08 
Percent Black 0.228 0.188 
Percent Hispanic 19.997 19.0859 
Police Per Capita  0.344 0.133 







 Index of Dissimilarity  Percent Vacant Housing Female Headed Household Poverty   
 SE Beta T Sig SE Beta T Sig SE Beta T Sig SE Beta T Sig VIF 
DLE per capita 2.90 0.137 0.992 0.326 224.48 -0.237 -1.363 0.178 137.9 0.147 0.825 0.413 84.01 0.26 2.34 .023* 2.363 
DLE per capita 2 7.80 -0.124 -1.188 0.24 600.33 0.039 0.297 0.768 368.8 -0.051 -0.384 0.702 224.60 0.067 -0.803 0.426 1.336 
                  
Control Variables                   
Intergovernmental Trfs 0 -0.031 -0.21 0.835 0 0.214 1.167 0.248 0 0.033 0.173 0.863 0 -0.234 -1.995 0.051 2.634 
Expense/ Revenue 0.02 0.182 1.616 0.112 1.40 -0.086 -0.608 0.546 0.86 -0.145 -0.999 0.322 0.52 0.109 1.207 0.233 1.565 
Unemployment  0.01 0.072 0.72 0.474 0.57 -0.259 -2.059 .044* 0.35 0.033 0.258 0.797 0.21 0.589 7.316 .000*** 1.24 
Percent Black  0.11 0.484 3.795 .000*** 8.11 -0.425 -2.649 .011* 4.98 0.278 1.692 0.096 3.03 0.391 3.82 .000*** 2.012 
Police per capita .25 0.213 1.573 0.121 12.90 0.311 1.83 0.073 7.40 -0.624 -3.579 .001*** 4.52 -0.099 -0.91 0.367 2.264 
R Square for the model 0.554    0.297    0.262    0.713     
*p<.05,**p<.01,***p<.001                  










 Index of Dissimilarity  Percent Vacant Housing Female Headed Household Poverty   
 SE Beta T Sig SE Beta T Sig SE Beta T Sig SE Beta T Sig VIF 
DLE per capita 2.35 0.404 2.504 .015* 224.40 -3.55 -2.049 .045* 129.23 0.179 1.07 0.289 89.99 0.418 3.508 .001** 2.151 
DLE per capita 2 6.51 -0.215 -1.706 0.094 620.75 0.088 0.648 0.52 357.43 -0.045 -0.345 0.731 248.92 -0.154 -1.654 0.104 1.317 
                  
Control Variables                   
Intergovernmental Trfs 0 -0.109 -0.642 0.524 0 0.344 1.876 0.066 0 -0.035 -0.196 0.845 0 -0.372 -2.958 .005** 2.403 
Expense/ Revenue 0.02 0.151 1.032 0.307 1.50 -0.128 -0.813 0.42 0.87 -0.052 -0.342 0.734 0.61 0.076 0.706 0.483 1.769 
Unemployment  0.01 -0.12 -9.38 0.352 0.62 -0.416 -3.037 0.004 0.36 0.198 1.496 0.14 0.25 0.665 7.064 .000*** 1.345 
Percent Hispanic 0 0.454 3.285 .002** 0.07 0.195 1.313 0.195 0.04 -0.305 -2.129 .038* 0.03 0.014 0.139 0.89 1.577 
Police per Capita 0.13 0.221 1.411 0.164 11.89 0.176 1.047 0.3 6.85 -0.614 -3.776 .000*** 0.12 0.111 0.962 0.34 2.025 
R Square for the model 0.335    0.231    0.283    0.637     
*p<.05,**p<.01,***p<.0
01                  
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Table 4 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1) 1               
(2) .425** 1              
(3) -.357** -.078 1             
(4) -.236 -.180 -.260* 1            
(5) .575** .267* -.429** .005 1           
(6) .494** .356** -.157 -.171 .298* 1          
(7) .040 -.027 -.015 -.170 .110 .154 1         
(8) .275* .303* .082 -.179 .035 .618** .029 1        
(9) .210 .359** .026 -.183 .049 .225 -068 .584** 1       
(10) .350** .094 -.316** -.083 .718** .186 .161 .096 .050 1      
(11) .685** .123 -.410** -.016 .627** .476** .089 .066 -.060 .401** 1     
(12) -.313* .317** .082 -.111 .066 -.213 .046 .029 .294* .229 -.434** 1    
(13) .592** .233 -.086 -.426** .370** .632** .285* .379** .133 .359** .620** -.272* 1   
(14) .603** .182 -.342** -.171 .592** .449** .164 .022 -.043 .385** .728** -.203 .493** 1  
(15) .591** .225 -.329** -.175 .546** .460** .094 -.005 -.031 .393** .865** -.269* .604** .784** 1 
*p<.05,**p<.01,***p<.001             
 
1 Dissimilarity Index Black                 6 Drug Law Enforcement 1                11 Percent Black 
2 Dissimilarity Index Hispanic           7 Drug Law Enforcement 2                 12 Percent Hispanic 
3 Vacant Housing                                8 Intergovernmental Transfers                                    13 Police per Capita 
4 Female Headed Households          9 Expenditure / Revenue                                               14 Violent Crime 
5 Poverty                                        10 Unemployment                                                           15 Homicide 
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Table 3 presents the regression results predicting rates of racial residential segregation for 
Hispanics, community instability, family disruption, and poverty. The drug law enforcement 
variable (DLE per capita 1) performs much better in explaining the Hispanic model. The variable 
shows a statistically significant positive relationship with the level of segregation for Hispanics 
at the .05 alpha level. This means that as the number of full time employees assigned to a city’s 
drug unit increases, Hispanics in that city become more segregated. The model is able to explain 
33% of the variance in the level of segregation. The variable also shows a statistically significant 
positive relationship with the level of community instability at the .05 alpha level. This means 
that as the number of full time employees assigned to a city’s special drug unit increases, the 
percent of vacant housing units (more vacant housing units signal more instability) also 
increases. Thus, the city becomes more unstable or disorganized. The model is able to explain 
23% of the variance. The variable also shows a statistically significant positive relationship with 
the level of poverty at the .01 alpha level. This means that as the number of full time employees 
assigned to a city’s drug unit increases, the poverty rate in that city increases. The model is able 
to explain 63% of the variance in poverty.  
Table 4 presents the bivariate correlations between all variables. The city drug law 
enforcement variable (DLE per capita 1) shows a statistically significant positive relationship at 
the .01 alpha level with the index of dissimilarity for Blacks, Hispanics, the violent crime rate, 
and the homicide rate. The variable also shows a statistically significant positive relationship at 
the .05 alpha level with the poverty rate. This means that in a bivariate relationship, as the 
number of full time employees assigned to a city’s drug unit increases, the level of segregation 
increases for Blacks and Hispanics. Moreover, as the number of full time employees assigned to 
a city’s drug unit increases, the violent crime and homicide rate in that city increase, along with 
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the poverty rate. Consistent with other studies, the index of dissimilarity for blacks shows a 
statistically significant positive relationship with poverty, violent crime and homicide rates. 
Collinearity  
Several researchers have noted that high multicollinearity might be present among 
structural covariates in homicide studies (Land et al., 1990; Messner, 1982; Smith & Parker, 
1980). In order to check for collinearity and to ensure the data is clean of severe errors, a residual 
scatterplot was conducted. Upon close examination, the errors seem to be random and do not 
follow a pattern, thus abiding by the 8 rules mentioned in the previous section. Secondly, an 
inspection of the correlation matrix (Table 4) reveals 4 correlations that exceed .70; the 
unemployment rate (.718), percent black (.865), intergovernmental transfers (.945), and the 
violent crime rate (.784). However, high correlations among explanatory variables are not 
necessarily a problem when it comes to inference (see Maddala, 1992; Kovandzic et al., 1998). 
Thus, upon first examination, there are no signs of problematic multicollinearity. In order to 
further evaluate possible issues of multicollinearity, the variance inflation factor (VIF) scores 
were examined (Table 2 and 3) (see Kovandzic et al., 1998; Fisher & Mason, 1981; Neter et al., 
1990). VIF scores are usually seen as problematic if they exceed 4 and VIF scores of 10 or 
greater are generally considered signs of harmful collinearity (Kovandzic et al. 1998; Kennedy, 
1985; Neter et al., 1990). After carefully revising the residual scattered plot, bivariate correlation 








The purpose of this study was to fill the gap in the social disorganization literature by 
empirically testing the arguments put forward by Sampson and Wilson (1995), in which they 
argue that wider macro structural factors or conscious political decisions (conceptualized in this 
study as drug law enforcement activities) are responsible for disproportionately consigning 
minorities into communities marked by structural social disorganization and cultural social 
isolation. The study was guided by the following questions, (1) What is the relationship between 
drug law enforcement activities and structural antecedents of social disorganization theory 
(poverty, family disruption, residential instability, and residential segregation) in cities with 
250,000 residents or more? (2) What is the relationship between drug law enforcement activities 
and violent crime rates in cities with 250,000 residents or more? The hypotheses stated that (1) 
As drug law enforcement activities increase, structural antecedents of social disorganization will 
increase, and (2) as consistent with the literature, as these structural antecedents increase, violent 
crime rates will increase. 
The literature review provided the reader with an overview on social disorganization 
theory and the war on drugs. By emphasizing complex interactions of individual level predictors 
of crime and community characteristics, the social disorganization framework is suited to 
address problems associated both to drugs and drug law enforcement practices that are 
concentrated in poor large urban areas. In this study, the war on drugs was taken as the only 
federal urban policy that has been passed since the 1970s to address the social ills that 
concentrate in large cities. However, because the war on drugs came as a visceral and instinctive 
reaction to a moral panic, the social problems the policy intended to remedy were exacerbated. A 
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review of the literature points to drug law enforcement as increasing drug market violence (Werb 
et al., 2011), drug induced mortality rates (Shepard & Blackley, 2004), and negative public 
health outcomes (Drucker, 1999).  
As stated by Chamliss (1994) and Becket (1994), policy efforts to address drug problems 
cannot be explained by public opinion, nor a rise in the crime problem, rather these policies have 
emerged as a conscious political strategy by politicians who seek to deflect attention from 
pressing issues; and attain political goals at the expense of the most disadvantaged groups of the 
population. Most of the social problems in urban areas were blamed on the violence and 
unruliness of the drug trade, thus justifying the elimination of much needed social programs. 
These programs were replaced with law enforcement and community policing programs sold as a 
comprehensive new approach to urban renewal. However, these programs increased the intensity 
and frequency of social control leaving urban areas vulnerable to aggressive over policing of 
drug laws. Such efforts were responsible for a sustained increase in rates of incarceration while 
having no serious effect on the crime problem.  
After running OLS regression analysis, the study found partial support for the 
hypotheses. As the number of full time police employees assigned to a city drug unit increases, 
the rate of poverty in the sample also increases, this is true for the Black and Hispanic models. 
The number of fulltime employees assigned to a city drug unit also has a statistically significant 
positive effect on levels of segregation and community instability for Hispanics. Furthermore, 
bivariate correlations show a positive relationship between the number of full time employees 
assigned to a city drug unit and violent crime rates along with homicide rates. Thus, the results 
are in line with the existing literature pointing to the negative consequences of aggressive drug 
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law enforcement in urban areas. The results, give partial empirical support for the arguments put 
forward by Sampson and Wilson (1995).  
Limitations and Future Research  
As any other study in the social sciences, this study is not perfect or free from some 
limitations. One limitation is the measure of drug law enforcement activities as conscious 
political decisions. While the number of full time employees assigned to a city drug unit and the 
number of full time employees assigned to a multiagency drug unit are good measures for the 
current study, it may not accurately reflect all efforts to enforce drug laws. For example, some 
drug enforcement activities may use regular police officers and employees to enforce drug laws 
in a variety of ways, such as pretextual traffic stops outside areas that are considered hot spots 
for drugs. Community oriented policing strategies also seek to enforce drug laws, regardless of 
their employee affiliation in a given police department. For example, Zhao and colleagues (2011) 
evaluate community oriented policing grants and their effect on productivity, measured as 
arrests. They note that the biggest increase in arrest rates are for drug offenses. Another example 
is the enforcement of drug laws by gang units who seek to arrest and or infiltrate gangs. Thus, 
the nature of policing in general and especially drug enforcement makes it hard to effectively and 
accurately quantify drug enforcement efforts.  
Future studies using this framework may include additional years of data to better gauge 
the effect of conscious political decisions on structural antecedents of social disorganization and 
crime. Also, different models with race specific independent variables may help researchers 
understand whether police department/ drug unit racial composition has an effect on crime and or 
arrest rates in these urban communities. Furthermore, a restructuring of the drug prevention and 
treatment budget at the federal and state level can also help researchers gauge how these 
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The results show a promising future for studies examining conscious political decisions 
as precursors for social disorganization and crime in urban areas. Future inquiries should look at 
other policies that have been passed in efforts to address social ills in large urban areas, and how 
these policies affect the social disorganization-crime relationship. For example, tax breaks or 
subsidies for big companies to open up businesses in inner cities may promote aggressive 
housing development and displace current residents who were able to afford property in the area 
prior to these companies moving in (Grantham & Chorbajian, 2012). Also, tax breaks to promote 
business and economic development may hurt residents of the local area whom rely on 
government run programs or services to survive or maintain a decent livelihood. While economic 
growth in a city is certainly welcomed, those companies who will benefit from locating their 
businesses in a given area should contribute to the well-being of that area as any other taxpayer 
should.  
Another fruitful area of research can be the evaluation of political contributions, and how 
these contributions lead to policy changes that can affect public health and safety. While the 
general public can advocate for changes in policies and laws, individual votes and requests carry 
little to no weight in a political process that is largely driven by money (Chambliss, 1999; 
Robinson, 2000). Instead, media reporting and more than 40,000 lobbying actions of more than a 
dozen interest groups affect legislation (Brunk & Wilson, 1991; Walker et al., 1996). For 
example, in terms of sustaining the prison population, Corrections Corporation of America 
(CCA) is notorious for spending money to see their interest preserved through legislative action. 
While minorities were being funneled through the criminal justice system at astronomical rates, 
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CCA’s common stock soared, rising 385% in 1995. A major investment newsletter even 
published an article recommending these stocks, claiming that crime could indeed pay 
(Robinson, 2000; ACLU, 2011). The lobbying efforts by CCA are funding political campaigns 
and securing contracts worth billions of dollars. CCA alone spent over $18million in federal 
lobbying between 1999 and 2009, and close to $1 million dollars in 2010 alone employing 
several firms to lobby for them (ACLU, 2011). It comes to no surprise that the sentencing 
disparities for crack vs. cocaine were upheld twice by congress without having any scientific or 
empirical data justifying the disparity. Congress upheld the sentencing disparity in 1995 and 
again in 2002, despite the recommendation of the US sentencing commission to eliminate the 
disparity in penalties due to its disproportional effects on minorities (Sirin, 2011). 
Pharmaceutical companies are also spending millions of dollars lobbying to ensure their 
interests are met and preserved through legislative action.  A report from the Center for 
Responsive Politics shows that between 1990 and 2015, pharmaceutical companies have donated 
close to $1 billion dollars in a variety of ways including individual contribution, contribution 
from PACs, and soft/outside money to democrats and republicans (Center for Responsible 
Politics, 2015). While the government is waging war against the public on the basis of drug 
control, pharmaceutical companies are free to operate with little opposition to the deadly drugs 
they sell. While the consumption of hard street drugs has been on a steady decline, prescription 
opioid abuse has been rampant. From 1999 to 2010 overdose deaths due to prescription 
painkillers have quadrupled (NIDA, 2014). Pharmaceutical companies have been mass 
producing and introducing increasingly dangerous synthetic opioids to the American public with 
complete disregard for their safety. In 2010 alone, enough prescription painkillers were 
prescribed to medicate every American adult every 4 hours for a month (NIDA, 2014), yet there 
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has been no war on pharmaceutical companies or meaningful actions toward addressing this 
issue. 
Is it ok for pharmaceutical companies to destroy millions of lives because they pay taxes 
and fund political campaigns while claiming to sell safe products? One cannot ignore the fact 
that prescription opioids are responsible for more annual deaths than all illicit drugs combined 
(NIDA, 2014). Yet, there are no stories on the news about pharmaceutical companies or pain 
clinics in Florida being raided by SWAT teams. Where is the sense of urgency that was seen 
amidst the so called “crack epidemic” in the 1980s? These questions should be of great concern 
for the public. The fact that police departments are able to deploy war like tactics on presumed 
mid-level dealers in minority communities, while ignoring the overt disregard for public safety 
by pharmaceutical companies that mass produce and deliver incredibly dangerous prescription 
opioids is quite disturbing. 
 Perdue pharmaceuticals has been charged with criminal misbranding of OxyContin by 
claiming that it was less addictive and less subject to abuse and diversion than other opioids. 
Perdue pharmaceutical was mandated to pay $634 million dollars in fines, a small price to pay in 
the business of addiction  (Art Van Zee, 2009).  One ought to wonder whether the war on drugs 
has anything to do with public safety, since the emergence, mass production, and mass 
dispensing of prescription opioids pose the greatest threat to public safety when compared to 
other illicit drugs. In fact, in a recent study by Rigg et al. (2012) researchers noted that diversion 
of prescription opioids, defined as the transfer of a prescription drug from a lawful channel of 
distribution or use to an illegal one (p.145) is estimated to be a $25 billion a year industry. 
Moreover, the qualitative study shows that the most utilized source through which mid-level and 
wholesale dealers obtained prescription drugs were pain management clinics. The study shows a 
WAR ON DRUGS                                                                                                                                                          69 
 
trend in which drug dealers are easily able to obtain powerful opioids and sell them illegally 
without much risk. According to law enforcement agencies, most prescription opioids that are 
confiscated in the black market, can be traced back to these pain clinics which operate under the 
protection of the law dispensing millions of powerful opioids without much scrutiny (Rigg, et al. 
2012). 
Policy Implications 
The United States has devoted most of its efforts on enforcement strategies, and the 
societal consequences of this approach have been grave. However, focusing on prevention 
interventions and treatment initiatives may provide a better outlook on the current state of affairs 
regarding drug use and drug related harms. Prevention interventions are geared at the potential 
end customer. Often called demand side strategies, these focus on education and awareness so 
that people are less willing to become involved with drugs and experiment with them. Treatment 
strategies, like prevention interventions seek to limit the demand for alcohol and drugs by 
engaging with current drug users in recovery oriented programs. Needle exchange programs can 
be considered a perfect example. Current injection drug users (IDU’s) go to clinics and obtain 
clean needles, by doing so service providers are able to reach out to them and try to get them to 
commit to treatment or start the path to recovery (Ksobiech, 2003). 
There are countless studies with suggestions in regards to best practices when dealing 
with issues of drug abuse, but the biggest issue in implementing these strategies is the current 
platform for politics. As Drucker (2013) notes, empirical data is plentiful on what works in terms 
of harm reduction strategies, but the biggest issue in the implementation of these strategies are 
politically motivated government officials who blatantly disregard science to run for office on 
moral righteousness. Drucker also points to the widespread ideological hostility and professional 
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ignorance that is associated with the treatment of heroin addiction by opiate substitution 
therapies (OST), in which addicts are provided with methadone, buprenorphine, morphine and 
injectable heroin. OST has a better prognosis than many other chronic medical or psychiatric 
conditions, yet the norm throughout the United States is to steer away from these practices, 
because politicians construct these practices as helping addicts get high, not sober (Drucker, 
2013). 
If in fact, government officials are reluctant to change the current state of affairs based on 
their moral righteousness, they should at least change it because of the obvious financial benefits 
that reform can bring. The fact is, that since the war on drugs has started, the bulk of drug arrests 
have been for drug possession (80%), not for drug trafficking or dealing (20%) (BJS, 2005). The 
US drug control budget allocates 36% of their resources to domestic law enforcement, 14% in 
interdiction, and 6% in international drug control (BJS, 2005). This represents 56% of the budget 
going to enforcement practices aimed at arresting or dismantling drug operations. Treatment, 
only accounts for 39%, and prevention tactics only account for 5% of the budget (BJS, 2005).  
For every dollar federal and state governments spent on strict enforcement strategies, 
they spent 60 dollars shoveling up the consequences of aggressive enforcement and failed 
prevention strategies (The National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia 
University, 2009). The key to the war on drugs is prevention and treatment strategies, not 
aggressive drug law enforcement. Moreover, for every dollar spent on treatment the costs 
associated with crime and lost productivity are reduced by $7.46 (Rydell & Everingham, 1994; 
(The National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University, 2009). 
Regardless of political affiliations and moral stance, in a time were resources are scarce, 
legislators ought to evaluate their policies as investments. We have tried strict enforcement and 
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drug prohibition, and frankly the returns are not worth the investment. It is time to try a different 
approach and utilize empirical evidence and proven methods in addressing drug abuse and 
addiction. 
A realistic goal is needed, there is always going to be drug related problems and there is 
always going to be drug addicts. However, the government ought to choose to deal with these 
issues in a way that promotes public health and safety while reducing negative social 
consequences. Portugal offers a radical approach on harm reduction practices; in 2001 the 
government decriminalized possession and use of all drugs. Drugs are still illegal, but there is no 
criminal proceedings when a person gets caught with drugs or using them (Hughes & Stevens, 
2010). Although there has been a slight increase in rates of drug consumption by older citizens, 
overall, the decriminalization of possession and use of illicit drugs has had positive impacts, and 
rates of drug use are still lower in Portugal than in neighboring countries without 
decriminalization. For example, the burden of drug users in the criminal justice system has 
reduced. There has been a decline in reported illicit drug use among problematic drug users and 
adolescents. There has been an increased uptake of drug treatment, infectious diseases and opiate 
related overdoses have gone down. The amounts of drugs seized by authorities have increased, 
and there has been a reduction in the retail prices of drugs (Hughes & Stevens, 2010). Although 
Portugal doesn’t share the same demographics or political ideologies with the United States, 
decriminalization offers some hope in future drug policy endeavors. 
As Drucker (2013) argues, countless government funded studies have supported harm 
reduction strategies as successful in decreasing cases of infectious diseases and drug abuse. The 
belief that needle exchange programs and Opiate substitution treatment increase drug abuse is 
nothing but a myth. The reluctance to accept medical science and empirical data in addressing 
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drug related issues is costing billions of dollars along with thousands of lives. Enforcement 
strategies and supply side interventions have been in place for decades now, and the reality is 
that they just do not work. Politicians ought to do what is best for their constituents, not their 
political career, and begin to address the issues and consequences of strict enforcement 
strategies. Drug units should be cut at the city level, so that proactive enforcement of drug laws 
in minority communities come to an end. Instead, this budget should go toward treatment and 
prevention strategies which are empirically proven to do a better job at combating the issues 
associated with drug use and addiction, while having few negative social consequences. Also, by 
eliminating drug units at the city level, police departments will be forced to prioritize their efforts 
and target drug trafficking organizations and high level dealers without wasting time on 
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